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Abstract 
This article develops a Gramscian approach to the governance of ‘informal’ economies through a 
historical study of ILO programmes in East Africa. Drawing on Gramsci’s conception of the 
‘subaltern’, the article highlights the ways in which the articulation of ‘informality’ in policy 
documents is coloured by broader struggles over the political organization of labour. The article 
develops this argument through two case studies. The first examines the World Employment 
Programme mission to Kenya in the 1970s that popularized the concept of ‘informal’ labour. The 
second, a contemporary programme on apprenticeships in the informal economy that originated 
in Tanzania.  
 
Introduction 
‘Informal’ economies occupy an increasingly prominent place in policy debates about labour, 
poverty, and development.1 The ‘informal’ economy has also attracted a good deal of critical 
academic commentary.2 As a number of authors have noted, talking about urban poverty in terms 
of the ‘informal’ economy often obscures the power relations lying at the root of poverty by 
suggesting a binary between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies and explaining the poverty of 
the latter simply by its exclusion from the former.3 In short, policies aimed at the ‘informal’ are 
often a problematic basis for reducing urban poverty because they fail to address the structural 
roots of poverty and lumps together a variety of very different employment relations.  
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However, while previous critics have rightly pointed out a number of important limitations in 
policy discourses about informal labour, few studies have stepped back to examine the politics of 
the production and circulation of the concept of the ‘informal’ sector itself. This article 
complements existing critical perspectives by developing a broadly historical materialist analysis 
of the development and mutation of the concept of ‘informality’ itself in global policy discourse. 
I do so by drawing on Gramsci’s conception of the ‘subaltern’ as a means of situating the 
emergence and development of policy ideas about the ‘informal’ in the broader context of 
political struggles over the relationships between class, work, and political order. This approach 
is useful because it allows us to see how discourses of ‘informality’ contribute to broader 
hegemonic drives to depoliticize poverty on one hand, and how these disciplinary functions are 
coloured in their ideological and practical form by particular political struggles over class and 
political authority on the other. Rather than developing a critique of policy discourses on the 
‘informal’, then, this Gramscian approach helps in explaining the intersecting and multi-scalar 
political dynamics underlying its origins and its adaptation in particular contexts, as well the 
wider political significance of this trajectory. 
 
Empirically, the article draws on archival, documentary, and interview research on the activities 
of the ILO in East Africa, with specific analyses of the Kenyan mission on employment policy in 
1971 that popularized the concept of the ‘informal’ sector, and a contemporary regional initiative 
on ‘Upgrading Apprenticeships in the Informal Economy’, which originated with a pilot project 
in Tanzania starting in 2007. Evidently this is far from a comprehensive survey of the ways in 
which the concept of the ‘informal’ has been deployed, but given the broader significance of 
these articular projects for the ILO’s efforts to govern ‘informal’ labour, they are suggestive of 
the merits of the approach adopted here. The Kenyan mission did not invent the concept of the 
‘informal’ sector, but played a critical role in popularizing it and adopting it into global policy 
discourses. The Tanzanian project has played a crucial role in the elaboration of a region-wide 
framework on informal apprenticeships. It is thus an important example of the ways in which the 
concept has subsequently been adapted into different contexts. Together, these two examples 
offer a useful means of examining the ways in which the discourse of ‘informality’ has been 
developed and shaped by its application across different historical contexts. 
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This argument is pursued in four steps. The first section discusses in broad strokes the ways in 
which the ‘informal’ is discussed in global policy frameworks. The next section outlines an 
analytical framework for understanding these discourses drawing on Gramsci’s conception of the 
‘subaltern’. The final two sections apply this framework in tracing out the emergence of the 
emphasis on the ‘informal’ sector in ILO policies in the 1970s, particularly through an analysis 
of the 1971 Kenyan World Employment Plan (WEP) mission that did much to popularize the 
concept, and a contemporary project on informal apprenticeships, respectively.  
 
The ‘informal’ sector in global policy discourse 
The category of ‘informal’ work encompasses a dizzying array of different activities. 
Thus, it is often difficult to develop coherent policies for the ‘informal’ economy.4 In large part 
this results from the residual nature of the ‘informal’ itself as a concept. As Roitman notes, 
‘informal’ spheres ‘are delineated and analyzed as reactions to state and formal market 
“failures”’ -- hence, the ‘informal’ describes an absence rather than anything specific.5 Despite 
the apparent shakiness of these conceptual foundations, however, initiatives for managing urban 
poverty in the global south increasingly turn on policies directed at the ‘informal’ economy. Two 
main alternatives present themselves in existing policy discourses.  
 
Discussions of the informal economy at the ILO have tended to emphasize the exclusion of 
‘informal’ workers from opportunities in the formal economy and from social protection. 6 In 
2002, for instance, in a report on Decent Work and the Informal Sector, the relationship between 
informal work and ‘globalization’, is described as follows: ‘Where the informal sector is linked 
to globalization, it is often because a developing country has been excluded from integration into 
the global economy’.7 The ILO suggests that these ‘exclusions’ from the global economy are 
compounded by failures in governance -- the recent report on ‘transitions’ to formality is quite 
explicit on this point: ‘Informality is principally a governance issue’.8 The upshot is that the ILO 
emphasizes the promotion of ‘formal’ job opportunities:  
A new consensus has emerged around the belief that if economic growth is not 
associated with formal job creation, a shift towards better employment 
opportunities in the formal economy and an improvement in the conditions of 
employment in informal activities, it will continue to generate inequality, poverty 
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and vulnerability.9 
Simply put, one way of governing the ‘informal’ is through the extension of ‘formal’ sector 
regulations and labour protections. Talking about the need for ‘formalization’ or for ‘transitions’ 
into the formal economy can, however, lead us to ignore the structural factors that have led to the 
decline of standard employment relations worldwide. They seek to resolve the tensions implicit 
in the restructuring of work, production, and governance over the last 40 years through what 
Selwyn calls ‘elite-led’ development solutions in which the poor are framed as passive recipients 
of enlightened governance by states and major corporations.10 Talking about ‘formalization’ of 
the informal economy, in short, often ignores the power relations that help create conditions of 
‘informality’ in practice. 
 
The other common policy approach, however, is equally problematic. In some analyses, heavily 
influenced by de Soto,11 ‘informality’ becomes a form of poor people’s empowerment in the face 
of overregulation by the state, a reflection of entrepreneurial instincts to be encouraged by 
developing appropriate institutions. Policy initiatives to promote micro-enterprise development, 
access to credit, skills, and property rights follow logically from this way of thinking about the 
‘informal’. The World Bank in particular has often promoted policy initiatives along these 
lines.12 As Rizzo rightly argues, this approach fails to consider the structural roots of urban 
poverty.13 It would be hard to deny the creativity with which the urban poor in much of the 
developing world often struggle to eke out a living, but the basic reality remains that such 
‘informal’ work strategies are often precarious survival strategies adopted in the face of long-
term crises in both local and global labour markets. Meagher similarly argues that the discourses 
of ‘social capitalism’ on which these policy narratives about entrepreneurship in the informal 
sector rest overlook the ways in which ‘informal’ economies are structured by broader 
institutional contexts and power relations spanning gender, religion, ethnicity, class, and the 
state.14 Phillips similarly argues that ‘informality’ often results from ‘adverse’ forms of 
incorporation into global production networks rather than ‘exclusion’ from the market.15 
Moreover, as Taylor notes, the kinds of institutional economics implicit in these narratives are 
rooted in a contradictory process in which, on one hand, informal institutions are framed as a 
form of cultural atavism needing to be removed or altered to allow the operation of ‘rational’ 
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market forces, and on the other, ‘informal’ institutions and the informalization of work are 
deepened by the workings of global capitalism.16 
 
In brief, then, policy responses to informality often swing between ‘formalizing’ and 
‘celebrating’ informal work, with neither alternative actually doing much to address the root 
causes of urban poverty. But, despite the ambiguities and shortcomings of the concept of the 
‘informal’ in general and of the ways in which it is applied by the World Bank, ILO, and others 
in practice, the concept persists. There is, accordingly, an emerging need for complementary 
critical analyses that problematize the emergence and development of the concept of the 
‘informal’ itself as an instrument of global governance. In short, alongside asking whether or not 
residualist conceptions of ‘informal’ labour are right or wrong, adequate or inadequate means of 
conceptualizing urban poverty, but also where they come from and what they do in practice. 
 
Global governance and the making of subalternity 
I argue in this section that Gramsci’s conception of the subaltern offers a useful framework for 
approaching this problem. The ‘subaltern’ refers in essence to the variable ways in which classes 
occupying marginal positions in broader structures of production are organized in relation to 
forms of political order in particular historical contexts. This history is closely entwined with 
what Gramsci calls the ‘objective formation’ of subaltern classes: ‘the developments and 
transformations occurring in the sphere of economic production; their quantitative diffusion and 
their origins in pre-existing social groups’.17 But Gramsci’s fundamental focus is on the ways in 
which the political organization of these subaltern classes is entangled with broader structures of 
political authority. The history of the subaltern ‘is intertwined with that of civil society, and 
thereby the history of states and of groups of states’.18 Gramsci’s understanding of the 
‘subaltern’, then, refers in a general sense to people occupying subordinate positions in broader 
structures of production and political power. Crucially, though, this open-ended definition is 
used to call attention to the politics of organizing and mobilizing these populations in particular 
ways. 
 
Gramsci differentiates a number of ways in which this engagement of subaltern social forces 
with existing ruling classes can be structured in particular historical circumstances, which range 
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on a continuum from the incorporation of subaltern classes into the political frameworks of 
existing dominant classes to autonomous political organization.19 This range of possibilities is 
usefully understood in conjunction with the concept of the ‘political relations of force’, which 
Gramsci develops elsewhere in the Prison Notebooks: ‘the degree of homogeneity, self-
awareness, and organisation attained by the various social classes’.20 Importantly, this conception 
identifies the political organization of the subaltern as a vital hinge on which the reproduction or 
transcendence of existing ruling classes hangs: if subaltern classes can be persuaded to identify 
their own interests with the ‘corporate interests’ of dominant groups, then existing forms of 
domination are likely to be far more durable. The ‘subaltern’ thus offers a kind of ‘class-
relational’ perspective,21 but one in which the political mobilization of class forces, rather than 
their rootedness in exploitative relations of production, is the main point of emphasis. These 
struggles, for Gramsci, are vital because they point to the fundamental political conditions 
necessary for the reproduction of existing forms of domination (or their transcendence). 
 
This perspective offers us a useful way of approaching the politics of informality insofar as it 
implies that we should situate global policy discourses targeting the informal sector in the 
context of broader local and national struggles over the political organization of labour. 
Residualist conceptions of the ‘informal’ serve to identify the interests of marginal urban 
workers with the deepening of markets or the extension of prevailing forms of labour regulation 
(rather than, say, with autonomous forms of political organization or the fundamental de-
commodification of labour). Insofar as they are successfully institutionalized in practice, they 
thus serve to re-articulate the position of existing ‘ruling classes’. This reading of Gramsci brings 
him somewhat in line with ‘post-development’ theories, which have highlighted the ways in 
which the project of international development has tended to limit the scope of political 
contestation in the Third World. They suggest that interventions championed by global and 
bilateral development agencies have routinely occluded the broader political economy of poverty 
and underdevelopment by representing ‘development’ in terms of ‘technical’ responses, to be 
effected by ‘experts’, to the barriers preventing poor populations from accessing global 
markets.22 This is broadly consistent with the interpretation of residualist discourses on the 
‘informal’ suggested by Gramsci’s conception of the subaltern. 
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However, I would suggest that Gramsci offers a more fruitful basis for analyzing the place of the 
discourse of informality in struggles over the political organization of poverty because of his 
insistence on an ‘absolute historicism’.23 Discursive articulations of the ‘corporate interests’ of 
subaltern social forces, for Gramsci, are variable and often fraught in ways that are best 
understood in relation to the ‘objective formation’ of subaltern classes on one hand and the 
contested character of their political organization on the other. The focus of post-development 
approaches is often on the discursive framing of subaltern populations; where Gramsci offers a 
means of situating these discourses in the context of underlying historic struggles.  
 
In short, the broadly Gramscian approach adopted here suggests complementing existing 
critiques of policy discourses on the ‘informal’ by situating the emergence of transformation of 
those discourses in the context of longer-run historical trajectories of transformations in the 
relations of production on one hand and political organization on the other. It allows us to 
problematize the origins and circulations of the concept of ‘informality’ by locating it in the 
context of shifting historical patterns of production and political organization. This approach is 
applied in the following two sections. I trace out the ways in which the concept of the ‘informal’ 
sector was adopted into the ILO’s advisory work on employment in Kenya in the 1970s, and 
applied in a contemporary project on apprenticeships in the informal economy in Tanzania. In 
keeping with the Gramscian framework outlined in this section, I situate these projects in the 
context of broader political struggles over the political organization of subaltern populations.  
 
The World Employment Programme and the ‘discovery’ of the informal 
The concept of the ‘informal’ sector found its way into global policy discourses largely through 
the work of the World Employment Programme (WEP) of the ILO, started in 1968. From the 
perspective of the present study, then, looking at the historic conditions under which this 
adoption took place is highly significant. The ways in which ‘informal’ labour was first 
articulated by the ILO in the context of employment policy in Kenya, and in particular the ways 
in which the ILO’s report fed back into the politics of employment in Kenya after the ILO 
mission, are a particularly salient demonstration of the practical entanglement between policy 
discourses about the ‘informal’ and struggles to organize and mobilize subaltern populations in 
particular ways. 
 8 
 
Many ILO officials locate the genesis of WEP in the ‘discovery’ that without widespread 
employment, economic growth did not necessarily lead to ‘development’ in the sense of greater 
human wellbeing.24 Kenya seemed to exemplify very clearly the problem of ‘employment’ that 
WEP had identified. Kenya had managed to achieve rapid rates of growth in the ten years 
following its independence from Britain, but it was not at all clear that the benefits of this growth 
were reaching the vast majority of the population. This was generally understood as the result of 
the dichotomy between the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ sectors of the economy -- in short, poverty 
was understood in residualist terms. This understanding of unemployment as a result of ‘dual’ 
economies was clearly identified in the preparatory work for the mission.25 The idea of the 
‘informal’ sector introduced a new vocabulary, but it clearly built on these longer-standing 
understandings of poverty. 
 
Significantly, the ILO mission took place in a context of ongoing struggles over the political 
organization of subaltern populations (including both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ workers) and their 
relation to the postcolonial state. In the late 1960s, the Government of Kenya increasingly sought 
to subordinate the political role of organized labour to the ruling party. Kenya’s Central 
Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) was formed in 1965 when the government dissolved the 
Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) and the rival Kenyan African Workers’ Congress. The KFL 
had split over interlinked personal disagreements among the leadership, questions of 
international affiliation, and the ‘political’ independence of trade unions. The new COTU was 
led by the factions aligned to the government, and it was prevented from pursuing ‘political’ 
action.26  
 
This set of struggles over the political role of organized labour coincided with efforts to 
institutionalize the differentiation of organized labour from other segments of subaltern classes. 
This was not necessarily always the case -- casual dockworkers, for instance, played a critical 
role in the early evolution of the labour movement in Kenya.27 As the labour movement was 
increasingly formalized, however, unionism was increasingly restricted to urban wage workers. 
In fact, state actors explicitly seized on this distinction to limit the political scope of trade union 
activity. Trade unions were identified as a major source of unemployment in the 1970 report of 
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the Parliamentary Select Committee on Unemployment in 1970 -- high levels of wage disparity 
between urban and rural areas, partly ‘as a result of the trade union activities’ were blamed for 
excessive rural-urban migration and the resort of capital to labour-saving technologies.28 The 
report recommended wage-restraint policies in urban areas.29 Tom Mboya, a former union leader 
and key figure in the country’s independence movement who served as Minister of Economic 
Planning and Development until his assassination in 1969, gave a lecture to the ILO’s 
International Institute for Labour Studies in 1967 in which he contrasted organized workers with 
‘the “have nots” in society [who] are not normally well organized and must rely on the 
government or political parties to represent their interests’.30 The broader point is that struggles 
over the political organization of subaltern populations were decidedly unsettled, and that 
mechanisms to institutionalize the segmentation of the workforce and restrict the political 
possibilities open to the union movement were crucial components of the state’s (still tenuous) 
hegemonic project.  
 
The original articulation of the concept of the ‘informal’ must be understood in the context of 
these struggles.31 The mission’s employment plan for Kenya put its primary emphasis on 
‘linking’ the formal and informal sectors:  
‘Our strategy of a redistribution from growth aims at establishing links that are at 
present absent between the formal and informal sectors… The various policies which 
we recommend… are intended to reduce risk and uncertainty on the part of those 
employed in the informal sector and to ensure a dynamic growth of this large 
segment of the Kenyan economy.’32 
Engineering ‘dynamic growth’ in the informal sector through appropriate policies reinforced the 
broader tendency towards the political marginalization of labour as the passive object of 
‘development’ interventions. Moreover, the image of separate ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sectors 
obscured power relations and linkages between the ‘formal’ capitalist economy and the 
‘informal’ that already existed. As Colin Leys noted in a perceptive critique of the report: 
‘Smallholders provide cheap food crops, pastoralists provide cheap beef, petty 
traders provide cheap distribution, 'subsistence' transporters provide cheap 
communications, the makers of shoes out of old tyres and the bicycle repairers and 
the charcoal burners and sellers provide cheap goods and services designed for the 
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poverty life-style of those whose work makes the 'formal sector' profitable, and 
which enable them to live on their wages.’33 
In short, the ‘informal’ was already intimately connected to the ‘formal’, especially in ensuring 
the reproduction of labour. Emphasizing ‘creating’ linkages between the formal and informal 
sectors, however, obscured these power-relational aspects of poverty. The significance of the 
broader, ongoing struggles over the relation of the state to the subaltern is visible in the extent to 
which the idea of the ‘informal’ diminished the role of trade unions and organized labour in the 
development process. While the report did discuss the potential role of trade unions in 
agriculture34 it had little or nothing to say about the possibility of organizing workers in the 
informal economy to have any kind of voice in policy-making, whether into existing union 
structures or independently.  
 
Interestingly, COTU did contest these dimensions of WEP’s work to some extent. It had sought 
to carve out a greater role in the build-up to the mission.35 The federation also tried 
(unsuccessfully) in its formal comments on the report to have some recommendations included 
about establishing tripartite decision-making structures for wages and incomes policy and 
employment creation that would enable greater input from trade unions.36 That the politically 
marginalizing effects of the report were contested is significant -- it underlines the conflictual 
nature of these efforts to organize subaltern populations. The concept of the ‘informal’ certainly 
reinforced one particular iteration of the politics of subalternity in Kenya, but the very practice of 
the ILO mission itself also opened up some opportunities, however marginal, for challenges to it. 
More importantly, the way in which the report itself was rolled out had distinct implications for 
ongoing struggles over the course of Kenyan development and control of the country’s political 
system. 
 
The Kenyan government published a sessional paper on employment in 1973 addressing the 
recommendations of the report.37 While most of the report was accepted ‘in principle’, 
implementation of the ILO’s recommendations was highly selective. Moreover, the Kenyan 
government’s commitment to the ‘have nots’ seems questionable in light of the specific reforms 
that were not pursued: e.g. a progressive land tax and limits on individual landholding; the 
ending of demolition of slum housing (and consequently of informal business premises); 
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redistributive incomes policy; and an end to harassment of petty traders.38 
 
At this point, then, it would be possible to conclude that the Kenya mission report and the 
concept of the ‘informal’ more broadly were problematic because they were relatively superficial 
reforms that were implemented only halfway -- as Leys and other critics rightly suggested in the 
years following the mission.39 However, to stop here would overlook the utility of the report 
itself, and the ways in which it was deployed by the Kenyan government as a means of 
reinforcing its position in ongoing struggles to organize subaltern social forces. Indeed, this was 
enhanced by precisely the things that prevented it having much impact on actual relations of 
poverty in practice. In short, the fact that the ‘informal/formal’ dichotomy occluded the structural 
or relational dimensions of urban poverty, the constriction of space for trade union input by the 
‘technical’ and ‘non-political’ nature of the report, and (perhaps especially) the fact that the 
report came with a set of ambiguous policy recommendations and limited capacity for follow-up 
on the part of the ILO, enabled the Kenyan government to legitimize an ‘development’ 
framework that rhetorically placed the government as the protector of the ‘have nots’ in Kenyan 
society by claiming the moral sanction of the ILO (to the exclusion of opposition parties or 
politically active trade unions), despite the fact that many of the ILO’s actual recommendations 
were either rejected or watered down. The WEP report’s actual impacts, in short, were 
profoundly shaped by the encounter between the report and the historic patterns of struggle over 
the organization of subaltern social forces in Kenya’s political economy. 
 
Indeed, further evidence for this view comes from a dispute with the Kenyan government 
stemming from a WEP working paper written by a junior ILO staffer in 1975. The working 
paper argued that the Kenyan state was not implementing certain recommendations of the report 
because the Kenyan government continued to ‘serv[e] the interests of the dominant classes’,40 
and that it was specifically ‘recommendations leading to fundamental structural change [that] 
have been rejected by the government’.41 It was, unsurprisingly, rather objectionable to the 
Kenyan government that this view should be published with the implicit endorsement of the ILO. 
The Ministry of Labour wrote to the Director General’s office to demand the retraction of the 
paper.42 In response to the complaint, the Director General wrote a letter of apology to the 
Kenyan Government, the ILO stopped circulation of the paper in question, and the employment 
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department changed its policies on working papers to prevent circulation outside the department 
without approval.43 This coda to the mission is interesting because it suggests a deliberate effort 
on the part of the Kenyan Government to retain the aspects of the WEP report -- namely the 
residualist conception of poverty implicit in the concept of the ‘informal’ -- that were most 
useful to it in the context of ongoing struggles over the political organization of subaltern 
classes. It also suggests that the specific colouration and political consequences of policy 
discourses around the informal are not fixed or immutable, but rather fluid and strongly 
conditioned by ongoing political contestation. The most important evidence for this latter point, 
however, comes from the ways in which the ‘informal’ has shifted in the process of being 
circulated across time and space. The following section thus turns to a brief analysis of a 
contemporary programme on informal apprenticeships in Tanzania to elaborate this argument.  
 
Governing informal apprenticeships in Tanzania 
Since the early 1990s, the concept of the ‘informal’ economy has been circulated across the 
operations of the ILO in virtually all policy areas.44 A comprehensive overview of these 
developments would be well beyond the scope of a single paper, instead this section considers 
one illustrative example of the ways in which contemporary applications of the concept have also 
been strongly coloured by political struggles over the organization of the subaltern, based on an 
ILO project on ‘Upgrading Informal Apprenticeships’. The project originated in Tanzania, and 
has since been expanded across sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The ILO conducted some research on apprenticeships in the informal sector in the 1970s, but this 
was almost entirely stopped during the period of structural adjustment. The World Bank cut 
funding for vocational training in the 1980s and early 1990s, suggesting that governments should 
concern themselves with providing basic elementary and secondary education, while other 
training could be done more efficiently by private employers.45 By the early 2000s, however, in 
the context of a growing emphasis at the ILO on unemployment, especially youth 
unemployment, officials in the ILO’s Skills and Employability Department (one of three 
branches of the newly re-organized Employment Sector) re-opened investigations into training 
practices in the informal sector, focusing in particular on apprenticeships. The ILO hosted a 
workshop on informal apprenticeships in Africa in Geneva in 2007.46 The workshop was 
 13 
followed up by a large research project on informal apprenticeships in Mtwara and Lindi regions 
of Tanzania.  
 
The Gramscian framework adopted in this paper suggests the need to place this project in the 
context of ongoing patterns of struggle over the political organization of subaltern social forces. 
The history of ‘informal’ work in Tanzania echoes that in neighbouring Kenya to some extent. 
Casual dockworkers played a critical role in the early development of trade unions;47 while after 
independence, state-dominated ‘formal’ sectors of the economy were increasingly identified as 
terrains for trade union action and increasingly made distinct from ‘informal’ spaces. This 
separation was reinforced by government hostility to small-scale self-employment. This set of 
arrangements deteriorated in the 1980s and 1990s. Privatization and deregulation under structural 
adjustment have often greatly expanded the place of ‘informal’ activities in workers’ livelihoods. 
The result has been growing differentiation within the sphere of ‘informal’ work, and the growth 
of power relations within ‘informal’ economies between employers and employees.48 Relations 
between formal and informal sector workers’ organizations remain difficult, with trade union 
interest in organizing informal workers varying widely by location and sector.49 
 
The growing importance of ‘informal’ employment also poses a significant set of political 
challenges for the state. While hostility and harassment of informal workers by local authorities 
has often persisted,50 the government has increasingly sought out means of organizing and 
regularizing the ‘informal’ economy. The government started a de Soto-influenced programme 
for ‘Property and Business Formalization’ (commonly called ‘Mkurabita’, based on the acronym 
in Swahili) in 2004. At its root, the programme is aimed at re-articulating the relationship of the 
state to subaltern populations in the wake of the transformations of ‘informal’ work highlighted 
above. This is most plainly visible in the growing emphasis on developing mechanisms for 
taxation of informal economies: 
Tanzania recognizes that a substantial amount of economic activities taking place in 
the small and medium business are not well recognized and regulated. Under the 
poverty reduction programs, Tanzania plans to increase the level of government 
expenditure and transfer payments to take care of the poorer sections of the 
population. Thus, government revenue may need to grow at a rate that exceeds the 
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growth of national income. With the limited revenue generated from the formal 
sector unable to cope with expenditure requirements, the extension of the tax net 
becomes a necessity.51 
On a very basic level, then, the ‘formalization’ drive should be read as an effort to stabilize the 
relationship between the state and a vast swath of the population living in its territory. This is, 
evidently, a very broad strokes picture of the evolution of the ‘objective formation’ of informal 
work in Tanzania, but it does highlight a number of salient tendencies. 
 
This history of struggle over the regulation of ‘informal’ workers played a considerable part in 
shaping the trajectory of the ILO project. This is visible in the first instance in the simple fact 
that target populations in Mtwara were often initially suspicious of the ILO project:  
The informal master crafts people are very suspicious when someone comes from the 
government. They tried to hide their training because they thought it’s an illegal 
system. So it took a lot of effort to convince these guys that we need to collaborate, 
it’s okay, we want to improve this system.52  
The project that took shape thus ended up depending very heavily on finding local collaborators, 
ranging from the national vocational training authority to (surprisingly) an order of Benedictine 
monks that had been established in the region under German colonial rule. A number of potential 
collaborators, including national trade union federations, were uninterested. Indeed, one ILO 
official interviewed suggested that the relative disinterest of trade unions played a significant 
part in preventing the pilot project findings on working conditions and exploitation in 
apprenticeships (see below) from being carried forward. 
 
The findings of the ILO project were outlined in a working paper published in 2009.53 The 
emphasis was placed -- as with a good number of other World Bank and ILO interventions54 -- 
on improving the institutional context of apprenticeships. The general thrust of the ILO’s 
proposals was that national and international policy interventions should proceed by ‘building on 
the traditional institutional framework, so that the incentives of [master craftspeople] and 
apprentices to participate in apprenticeships are sustained’.55 This approach came with some 
significant limitations. A particularly indicative set of issues emerged around the unregulated 
nature of ‘graduation’ from apprenticeship. Simply put, it was normally up to the master 
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craftsperson to determine when an apprentice had completed his or her apprenticeship; during 
the period of the apprenticeship, however, the apprentice continued to provide cheap or free 
labour for the master craftsperson. The project found that: 
There are some indications that MCs extend apprenticeship periods for some weeks 
or months in order to benefit longer from the difference between high productivity 
and low compensation of apprentices. A total of 42 per cent of MCs state that their 
apprentices are proficient some time before they terminate their apprenticeship… 
While apprentices undertake simple tasks during the first few months, and perform 
tasks requiring little skills during the following months, they are able to work 
independently with clients in the third stage of skills acquisition. At the third stage, 
apprentices demonstrate the productivity of a skilled worker, allowing the MC to 
recover training costs.56 
The study drew somewhat ambivalent conclusions about this practice:  
MCs have the authority to determine the end of apprenticeship, thereby taking into 
account the ability and talent of apprentices. The advantage of this flexible 
arrangement is that MCs can adjust the period of cost recovery and ensure that 
apprentices achieve the desired standards of competence. The downside of 
flexibility, however, is the risk of MCs taking advantage of this situation in order to 
gain additional returns. Some interviews with apprentices indicated that apprentices 
did not always agree with the MC’s decision on graduating the apprentice. This 
suggests that policies need to establish clear and transparent rules and criteria for 
termination of apprenticeship.57 
Here the ILO’s project comes in contact with power relations between ‘informal’ workers, and 
issues of potential or actual exploitation within the informal economy. The problem is still 
understood, however, in terms of an absence: that there are no clear regulatory criteria opens 
informal apprenticeship up to abuse. This is, no doubt, partially true. But the argument that 
upgrading institutions should solve the problem does little to address the power imbalance 
between master and apprentice, to say nothing of the broader structural context of widespread 
unemployment that facilitates this relation of power. A number of key areas for ‘upgrading’ were 
identified in the 2009 report: recognition of skills earned in informal apprenticeships in the 
broader economy, social security provisions for apprentices, and working conditions in informal 
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workplaces.  
 
As in the Kenyan case above, however, the actual emphases of subsequent interventions have 
reflected a relatively narrow subset of these concerns relatively well-aligned with ongoing state 
efforts at organizing subaltern populations, particularly emphasizing the recognition of skills. 
This is largely despite the broader efforts of the ILO. The Informal Apprenticeships project was 
oriented towards the delineation of common research methodologies, and a set of common 
training tools for policy-makers that would allow for a set of interventions that could be applied 
more widely.58 Similar studies were conducted in Malawi, Benin, and Zimbabwe. The emphasis 
of this broader project, as in Tanzania, is on ‘strengthening the institutional framework’ around 
informal training, by helping design policies aimed at ‘strengthening incentives and benefits 
from apprenticeship training, improving the decent work component, and securing public 
funding to finance the training’.59 The training guide aims to outline a set of ‘best practices’ for 
governing informal apprenticeships. Similar circulations of ‘best practices’ have also been 
carried out by more direct means, including by organizing study tours -- in May of 2010, for 
instance, officials from the ILO’s Pretoria office led a Zimbabwean delegation to Accra to study 
the existing arrangements for training in the informal economy in Ghana.60 The ILO’s project, 
then, aims to secure the spread of a definite set of institutional forms throughout the region 
through the circulation of particular kinds of knowledge. The ILO, in short, continues to 
emphasize the broader agenda emerging from the initial report on Tanzania. 
 
However, in terms of the actual implementation of follow-up initiatives, many of the concerns 
raised in the initial report about, say, exploitation and the rules around graduation have largely 
fallen from view. The most developed case in this respect is Tanzania. The main thrust of 
follow-up activity has been around ‘Recognition of Prior Learning’ (RPL).61 Broadly speaking, 
RPL programmes deal with the recognition and valuation of skills acquired in informal settings. 
As the Informal Apprenticeships project has progressed, the ILO has begun to pay increasing 
attention to the problems posed in this respect by the limited value often assigned to ‘informal’ 
learning by ‘formal’ employers – it is not enough for informal apprenticeships to simply produce 
better skilled workers,  ‘whatever skills they have acquired need to be assessed and also 
certified’.62 In 2014 the Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA) adopted a RPL 
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programme in collaboration with the ILO, in which VETA offers short courses to ‘artisans’ 
without formal credentials and certifies graduates.63 In this sense it is the aspects of the ILO’s 
project on Informal Apprenticeships that hew closest to the broader strategy implicit in 
Mkurabita have been carried over into specific programmes in Tanzania -- in particular, the 
emphasis on translating ‘informal’ economies into legible spaces that can be governed 
effectively by the state. As in Kenya in the 1970s, this trajectory is best explained by the history 
of struggles over the mobilization and organization of subaltern populations in which it is 
enmeshed. As noted above, the kind of institutional economics through which the ILO project 
has been articulated is highly limiting in terms of its capacity to conceptualize relations of 
domination or exploitation in the workplace,64 but even this relatively narrow agenda has been 
further constrained by the dynamics of ongoing struggles to organize subaltern classes in 
Tanzania.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has advanced a Gramscian interpretation of the emergence and development of the 
global governance of ‘informal’ economies. Previous critics have quite rightly pointed out that 
the ILO, World Bank, and others have relied on problematic, residualist readings of informal 
economies that elide the ways in which informal labour is produced by complex relations of 
domination and exploitation. This article complements these critiques by problematizing the 
emergence and circulation of the concept of the ‘informal’ itself. The durability of the discourse 
of ‘informal’ labour itself, despite its well-noted shortcomings, as well as the variability and 
mutability of the concept of the ‘informal’ across time and between different cases, suggests a 
need for more historically sensitive investigations of the ‘informal’ itself (and of like concepts). 
In tracing out the articulation of ILO interventions on ‘informal’ work in Kenya in the 1970s and 
contemporary Tanzania, this article suggests that these global policy frameworks are deeply 
coloured in practice by their interpenetration with more localized political struggles. 
 
Gramsci’s conception of the ‘subaltern’ is a particularly useful resource for this task insofar as it 
offers a way of situating the political struggles in which global policy discourses are often 
enmeshed in a broadly class-relational perspective. This approach helps us to explain how the 
governance of informal economies actually works in practice by highlighting the importance of 
 18 
political struggles over the subaltern. There is a growing need for studies that problematize the 
‘local’ enactments of ‘global’ policy frameworks for governing poverty and irregular work, of 
which ‘informality’ is a significant example, focusing on struggles over the subaltern offers a 
useful means of approaching this task. 
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